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MATERIALITY AND THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET
MODEL: A RECIPE FOR THE TOTAL MIX
ROGER J. DENNIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past thirty years, prodigious empirical and theoreti-
cal research and commentary has provided an economic perspec-
tive on the operation of capital markets. The literature has focused
on the efficient capital market model, which posits that security
prices fully reflect all available, relevant information. A corollary of
this thesis posits that security prices react promptly and in an un-
biased manner to any new information. Although researchers have
debated the parameters of the efficient market model, they agree
that the model accurately represents the market's actual operation.
Not surprisingly, the operation of capital markets also has been
a central concern in securities litigation. In many cases, the deter-
minative issues involve the importance of particular information to
the investor and the processing of such information by the market.
These issues often are decided under a legal standard of "material-
ity." Materiality may be important in several types of rule 10b-5
litigation, tender offer cases, and proxy litigation, among other
areas.
* Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, Camden, N.J. B.S.S. 1971, J.D. 1974,
Northwestern University. I am indebted to my research assistants, Hope Cone and Chris
Wyluda, for their efforts and to my colleague, Barbara Banoff, for her helpful comments and
ideas.
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The legal standard of materiality, however, has developed largely
without reference to the findings of the efficient capital market re-
searchers. This Article will compare legal notions of materiality
with the treatment of materiality in efficient capital market theory.
The Article presents an overview of the current state of research
on the efficient capital market model, a discussion of the legal tests
of materiality, and a comparison of the legal standard and the eco-
nomic model in different contexts. This Article's premise is that
recognition and use of the economic model will lead to more accu-
rate, predictable determinations of materiality in the context of se-
curities litigation. Courts that consider the results of efficient capi-
tal market research in analyzing the materiality issue will have a
better understanding of when information becomes public, how the
market processes information as an aggregate, and how different
estimates of the significance. of new information quickly combine
to create an unbiased equilibrium market price.
II. THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET MODEL: THE STATE OF
RESEARCH
Researchers agree that the efficient capital market model accu-
rately represents the pricing behavior of stocks.1 The model posits
that the price of a security reflects all publicly available informa-
l. For a review in the legal literature of the efficient capital market model, see Comment,
The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Se-
curities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031 (1977). See also Barry, The Economics of Outside
Information and Rule 10b-5, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1307 (1981). For a general review of the
utility of the efficient market model in securities litigation, see Fischel, Use of Modern Fi-
nance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 Bus.
LAw. 1 (1982). See generally J. LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE (1973); W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS (1970); Basu, In-
vestment Performance of Common Stocks in Relation to Their Price-Earnings Ratios: A
Test of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, 32 J. FIN. 663 (1977); Charest, Dividend Informa-
tion, Stock Returns and Market Efficiency-II, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 297 (1978); Fama, Efficient
Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); Finnerty,
Insiders and Market Efficiency, 31 J. FIN. 1141 (1976); Grossman, On the Efficiency of
Competitive Stock Markets Where Traders Have Diverse Information, 31 J. FIN. 573
(1976); Hellwig, On the Aggregation of Information in Competitive Markets, 22 J. ECON.
THEORY 477 (1980); Kanodia, Effects of Shareholder Information on Corporate Decisions
and Capital Market Equilibrium, 48 ECONOMETRICA 923 (1980); Radner, Rational Expecta-
tions Equilibrium: Generic Existence and the Information Revealed by Prices, 47
ECONOMETRICA 655 (1979); Verrecchia, Consensus Beliefs, Information Acquisition, and
Market Information Efficiency, 70 AM. ECON. REv. 874 (1980).
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tion about a firm, and that prices react almost instantaneously and
in an unbiased manner to any new information.2 These two notions
are obviously interrelated. If share prices always reflect all publicly
available information, then prices must adjust promptly to any
new data. As a normative matter, a market that operates in the
manner described by the model is economically desirable because
investment will be channeled into the most profitable areas and
capital will be allocated efficiently.' Moreover, capital formation is
encouraged by an efficient market. Such a market reduces the risk
of ownership, thus reducing the cost of capital. If the market price
efficiently reflects all public information, then investors can have
more confidence that the variance of prices will be more stable
than if the market were inefficient.4
Research concerning the efficient market model has tested the
thesis at three different levels: the weak form, which tests the be-
lief that past price information contains no data that investors can
use to obtain profits in excess of the profits a simple buy-and-hold
strategy would produce; the semi-strong form, which suggests that
the stock market promptly and accurately incorporates into the
market price all publicly available information about a particular
stock, so that an investor can earn risk-adjusted profits in excess of
a buy-and-hold strategy only if the investor has access to inside
information; and the strong form, which posits that although some
use of inside information occurs in securities transactions, no sub-
stantial and consistent use of inside information occurs in a fash-
ion that routinely disturbs a stock's equilibrium price.
The weak form of the model criticizes those investment advisors
and their customers who believe that technical analysis5 can result
in profits above a risk-adjusted market rate of return. Technical
analysts assert that mechanical rules based on historical pricing
2. Fama, supra note 1 at 383-84; see also Cowton & Garrod, Clearing the Fog Around the
Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 92 AccT. 107 (Aug. 1981).
3. Kanodia, supra note 1; Comment, supra note 1, at 1035. See also W. BAUMOL, THE
STOCK MARKET AND ECONoMIc EFFICIENCY 36 (1965).
4. Lorie, Insider Trading: Rule 10b-5, Disclosure, and Corporate Privacy: A Comment, 9
J. LEGAL STUD. 819 (1980).
5. Technical analysis is also known as chartist analysis. The basic premise of the chartist
model is that history repeats itself, and that patterns of a security's price behavior will
recur. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 55 (Sept.-Oct.
1965).
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patterns, sometimes coupled with the use of selective financial
data, can predict future share prices profitably.6 If securities prices
moved predictably, an investor might be able to develop profitable
trading rules based on historical pricing information. Because such
historical information is public, technical analysis is fundamentally
at odds with the efficient market model. Stated differently, techni-
cal analysts believe that future stock prices depend on past prices.
The efficient market model, on the other hand, posits that only
new information can affect a stock's future equilibrium price. Be-
cause the production of new information is essentially a random
process,7 technical analysts should not be able to form profitable
trading rules based on historical information which, by definition,
the price of a stock already reflects.
In evaluating the weak form, the data supports the efficient mar-
ket model rather than the technical analysis position. Formal sta-
tistical evaluations such as serial correlation, spectral analysis, and
runs tests do not show any significant dependences for a series of
stock prices." Technical strategies based on filter rules, moving
6. Id.
7. Id. at 56.
8. Serial correlation tests provide "a measure of the relationship between the value of a
random variable at time t and its value r periods earlier." M. FIRTH, SHARE PRICES AND
MERGERS 14-16 (1976). See Cowels & Jones, Some A Posteriori Probabilities in Stock Mar-
ket Action, 5 ECONOMETRICA 280, 294 (1937) (concluding that speculators could not use this
type of forecasting with any assurance of consistent profits); Fama, The Behavior of Stock
Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34, 65 (1965) (evidence produced by the serial correlation model
suggests that dependences in successive price changes are either extremely slight or com-
pletely nonexistent).
Spectral analysis tests examine the assumption that the "values of one variable are known
at t=1,2,3. . .n and a number of functions based on this series can be calculated. These can
be used for hypotheses regarding the actual structure of the time series." M. FIRTH, supra.
See Godfrey, Granger & Morgenstern, The Random Walks Hypothesis of Stock Market
Behavior, 17 KYKLos 1, 22-24 (1964) (the price determining mechanism that the random
walk hypothesis describes "is the only mechanism which is consistent with the unrestrained
pursuit of the profit motive by participants in the market.... [No simple functional rela-
tionship between the observed variables is likely to be of value."); Granger & Morgenstern,
Spectral Analysis of the New York Stock Market Prices, 16 KYKLOS 1, 17 (1963) (No com-
monly assumed strong cycles have been found. Short-run movements of the series obey the
random-walk theory, while long-run components could be of greater value than the theory
suggests. Seasonal variation, business-cycle components, and the relationship between vol-
ume and price, however, were of little value.).
Runs tests involve an analysis of the duration of successive price movements. The results
of these tests for individual stocks, as well as for indices, are compared against the mathe-
[Vol. 25:373376
19841 MATERIALITY AND THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET 377
averages, fixed proportion maintenance strategies, and relative
strength tests also have failed to show that any suggested technical
strategy leads to supranormal profits.9 Indeed, many of the techni-
cal strategies underperform the general market.10 In sum, past
pricing data is not a profitable investment tool.
The semi-strong form of the efficient market model challenges
the thesis that fundamental analysis of specific stocks can lead to
supranormal gains.1 Fundamental analysis operates on the pre-
mise that the evaluation of publicly available informa-
tion-fundamental factors-such as industry prospects, expected
product developments, and management ability will enable an ana-
matical expectation of runs. M. FIRTH, supra.
9. Filter rules "provide buy and sell signals when share prices have moved a certain per-
centage away from a high or low point." M. FIRTH, supra note 8, at 17. See Alexander, Price
Movements in Speculative Markets: Trends or Random Walks No. 2, 5 INDUS. MGMT. REV.
25 (Spring 1964); Fama & Blume, Filter Rules and Stock Market Trading, 39 J. Bus. 226,
238-40 (1966). The results of these studies show that the order of magnitude of any predic-
tive filter rule does not exceed the transaction costs associated with operation of the rule.
These results thus support the hypothesis that the efficient capital market model is an ade-
quate description of price behavior.
Moving average tests involve buying or selling shares as their prices move above or below
their averages. Tests show that this technique does not outperform a buy-and-hold strategy.
James, Monthly Moving Averages-An Effective Investment Tool? 3 J. FIN. & QUAN. ANAL-
Ysis 315, 324-26 (1968); Van Home & Parker, The Random Walk: An Empirical Test, 23
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 87, 90-92 (1967); Van Home & Parker, Technical Trading Rules: A Com-
ment, 24 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 128, 130-32 (1968).
Fixed proportion maintenance strategies involve adjusting the amount of securities held
so that the total dollar value proportion of each security in a portfolio remains the same at
the beginning and end of the time period considered. Again, when adjusted for transaction
costs and tax effects, this approach does not produce supranormal profits. Evans, An Analy-
sis of Portfolio Maintenance Strategies, 25 J. FIN. 561 (1970); Young, Test of Portfolio
Building Rules, 24 J. FIN. 595 (1969).
Relative strength tests involve the ranking of shares in terms of price performance over
some time period and investing in the top performing stocks and selling the poorly perform-
ing securities. The premise is that good and bad performance will tend to repeat in the next
time period. This does not occur. See Jenson and Bennington, Random Walks and Techni-
cal Theories: Some Additional Evidence, 25 J. FIN. 469 (1970).
10. See Levy, The Predictive Significance of Five-Point Chart Patterns, 44 J. Bus. 316
(1971).
11. Fundamental analysis attempts to predict the future worth of a company based pri-
marily on the company's future earnings prospects. The theory posits that a stock has some
intrinsic worth that may depart from its value as measured by the market price. The leading
work on fundamental analysis is B. GRAHAM, D. DODD & S. COTTLE, SECURITY ANALYSIS:
PRINCIPLES AND TECHNIQUES (4th ed. 1962). See also J. COHEN, E. ZINARAO & A. ZnKFL,
INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT (1973).
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:373
lyst to forecast a firm's prospects better than the market as a
whole. 2 The efficient market model instead states that the com-
petitive marketplace, where many investors evaluate the same
data, prevents this strategy from being successful.13 Competition to
produce useful information and competition in evaluating the data
produce a new equilibrium price so rapidly that supranormal prof-
its from the production and evaluation of data are not possible.
The semi-strong form of the efficient market model has been
tested in two ways. The first test attempts to directly measure
market reactions to new information. These studies have observed
such events as announcements of earnings, stock splits, dividend
announcements, and accounting changes.' 4 The studies found that
the market reacted to the new data in the expected direction and
that the price change occurred in such a short time that no inves-
tor could earn supranormal profits by trading on the new informa-
tion. These studies thus support the theory that the market
12. Much of the regulation of disclosure under federal securities law is premised on a
belief in fundamental analysis. See, e.g., H. KRIPKE, THE SEC AND CORPORATE DISCLOSURE:
REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE 25 (1979). Recently, the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission began to use the teachings of the efficient market model in its regulatory activities,
particularly with respect to integrated disclosure. Reproposal of Comprehensive Revision of
System for Registration of Securities Offerings, SEC Release No. 6331, Report No. 926 (Aug.
6, 1981) (adopted in SEC Release No. 6383 (Mar. 3, 1982)). For a critique of these activities,
see Pickholz & Horahan, The SEC's Version of the Efficient Market Theory and Its Impact
on Securities Law Liabilities, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 943 (1982).
13. See, e.g., Cragg & Malkiel, The Consensus and Accuracy of Some Predictions of the
Growth of Corporate Earnings, 23 J. FIN. 67 (1968). See also Pozen, Money Managers and
Securities Research, 51 N.Y.U. L. REV. 923, 934 n.71 (1976).
14. Ball & Brown, An Empirical Evaluation of Accounting Income Numbers, 6 J. Accr.
RESEARCH 159 (1968) (results demonstrate that the market anticipates most of the informa-
tion contained in reported income before issuance of an annual report); Brown & Kennelly,
The Informational Content of Quarterly Earnings: An Extension and Some Further Evi-
dence, 45 J. Bus. 403, 414 (1972) (substantiating the results of Ball & Brown, supra);
Charest, supra note 1 (dispute in the literature whether dividend change announcements
contain information that causes abnormal market activity for significant time frames; some
evidence exists showing such effects-evidence potentially inconsistent with complete mar-
ket efficiency); Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Infor-
mation, 10 IrNr'L EcoN. REV. 1 (Feb. 1969) (concluding that the price of a stock at the time
of a stock split generally reflects new information concerning the firm's future dividend pay-
ments); Kaplan & Roll, Investor Evaluation of Accounting Information: Some Evidence, 45
J. Bus. 225 (1972) (no statistically significant effect from accounting changes); Sunder,
Stock Price and Risk Related to Accounting Changes in Inventory Valuation, 50 AccT.
REV. 305 (1975) (changes in the market prices of stocks are associated with the changes in
the economic value of the firms rather than changes in reported income).
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promptly and correctly processes new information.
The second test examines portfolio performance of managed
funds using an investment strategy based on fundamental analy-
sis.15 If fundamental analysis were a successful investment strat-
egy-that is, if it produced supranormal profits-then managed
funds as a group, on a risk-adjusted basis, should outperform the
general market. Several studies have measured the rate of return
on managed funds against a randomly selected portfolio of similar
risk. These studies have shown that the managed funds did not
consistently outperform randomly selected portfolios.16
The empirical studies of the semi-strong form of the model thus
support the theoretical insight that in a competitive market-like
the one in which securities analysts operate-where many compet-
ing experts analyze the same information, trading induced by ana-
lysts will bring a particular security's price promptly to a dynamic
equilibrium point. This price should represent the security's intrin-
sic value. 17 As the product of such a process, the price of a security
represents the consensus of the various competitors in the mar-
ket." As new information is produced, the price of a security reacts
promptly. Over or under adjustments are random, and are reme-
died quickly.19 The price of a security randomly fluctuates around
the consensus price, which represents the processing of new infor-
mation and the impact of that information on investors.20
15. For the results of many of the studies, see J. LomE & M. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at
88-98; Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-64, 23 J. FIN. 389
(1968) (evidence of mutual fund performance indicates not only that the studied funds on
average were unable to predict securities prices, but that individual fund performance did
not exceed that which one would expect from chance). See also J. COHEN, E. ZINBARG & A.
ZEIKEL, supra note 11.
16. See supra note 15. See also Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. Bus. 119 (1966)
(differences in return among funds exist when measuring performance by both average risk
and return; such differences arise from differences in expense ratios, rather than the predic-
tive capacity of the fund manager).
17. Black, Implications of the Random Walk Hypothesis for Portfolio Management, 27
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 16 (1971).
18. See Grossman, supra note 1; Hellwig, supra note 1; Verrecchia, supra note 1.
See also Figlewski, Information Diversity and Market Behavior, 37 J. FIN. 87 (1982) (mar-
ket reveals much information, but not all); Mayshaw, On Divergence of Opinion and Imper-
fections in Capital Markets, 73 AM. EcoN. REv. 114 (1983) (price of an asset depends on
both the marginal and average investor).
19. Fama, supra note 1, at 413-16.
20. Id.
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The efficient market model describes only the aggregate behavior
of the market. Individual investors may have incomplete data or
may have different views of the significance of information. The
market mechanism, however, combines these different perceptions
of the appropriate price and produces an equilibrium price that
equals the price that would prevail if all investors had access to
complete data and interpreted the data in the same manner.21 In-
dividual investors may have biased perceptions, but the market
averages these variant views to form an unbiased estimate of the
value of a security.22
The strong form of the efficient market model asserts that the
price of a security promptly reflects all material public and non-
public information. Empirical research has not supported fully this
view.23 Studies of trading by corporate insiders and marketmakers
indicate that these market participants do make supranormal prof-
its from trading on information not yet available to the general
market.24 Although this trading alone will not create the post-dis-
21. See supra note 18. Professor Baumol suggests an alternative explanation for the phe-
nomenon. He argues that individual stock prices are the result of irrational decisionmaking,
including an attempt to guess how other investors will respond to future events. W. BAUMOL,
THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 53 (1965).
22. See supra note 18. See also Samuelson, Proof That Properly Anticipated Prices
Fluctuate Randomly, 6 INDUS. MGMT. REV. 41 (1965). But see Bjerring, Lakonishok &
Vermaelen, Stock Prices and Financial Analysts' Recommendations, 38 J. FIN. 187 (1983)
(evaluation of investment advisors' recommendations indicated that investors could earn
positive abnormal returns, but extent of access to inside information could not be ascer-
tained). Black, Yes Virginia, There Is Hope: Test of the Value-Line Ranking System, 29
FIN. ANALYSTS J. 10 (1973) (positive return attributed to the use of Value-Line recommenda-
tions); Lloyd-Davies & Canes, Stock Prices and the Publication of Second-Hand Informa-
tion, 51 J. Bus. 43 (1973) (some positive return attributed to the use of security analysts'
recommendations).
23. Lorie & Niederhoffer, Predictive and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, 11 J.
LAw & ECON. 35 (1968); Penman, Insider Trading and the Dissemination of Firms' Fore-
cast Information, 55 J. Bus. 479 (1982). See also Carlton & Fischel, The Regulation of
Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1983).
24. Finnerty, supra note 1 (insiders are able to identify profitable and unprofitable situa-
tions affecting their own companies, and by trading on such information they can out-
perform the market). See also Barry, supra note 1; Jaffe, The Effect of Regulation Changes
on Insider Trading, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sm. 93 (1974) [herinafter cited as Jaffe,
Regulation Changes]; Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410
(1974).
On marketmakers, see Niederhoffer & Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the
Stock Exchange, 61 J. AM. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 879 (1966) (specialists who have access to
unique information concerning supply and demand factors affecting a particular stock are
380
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closure equilibrium price, insider trading may move the price in
that direction.
The implications of this research on an examination of the legal
definition of materiality are profound. If the efficient market
model were the explicit basis of the inquiry into materiality, then a
court would focus on two limited questions: when did a specific
item of information become public-that is, when did it become
available to a sufficient number of participants in the market; and
was the information of the quality that would change the consen-
sual belief concerning the value of a security? In answering these
questions, the model would inform courts that all public informa-
tion is available to market participants through the price-signalling
mechanism, and that the market processes information rapidly. An
examination of the legal doctrine of materiality reveals the judicial
view of the subject.
III. EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL STANDARD OF MATERIALITY
To prevail in a securities fraud case, a plaintiff usually must
show that the defendant misstated or withheld material informa-
tion.25 The leading case on the definition of materiality is TSC In-
able to earn an abnormal rate of return).
25. The major federal securities statutes and regulations prohibit the making of false or
misleading statements. For example, §§ 11(a) and 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k(a), 77q(a)(2) (1982), proscribe the making of "any untrue statement
of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the
statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing." The Securities Exchange Commission copied this language substantially in promulgat-
ing rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a)-9 (1983), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5
(1983), pursuant to §§ 14(a) and 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78n(a), 78j(b) (1982). In addition, § 14(e) of the Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982),
also uses the same test. By its terms, the language requires a determination of the material-
ity question. The definition of "material" for 1934 Act reporting purposes states that a fact
is material if a "substantial likelihood [exists] that the reasonable investor would attach
importance [to the fact] in determining whether to buy or sell the securities registered." 17
C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (1983). See also FEDERAL SEC. CODE § 202(92) (1980). The analysis of
the efficient market model in this Article is limited to actively traded securities. The consen-
sus is that the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock Exchange are efficient
markets. The over-the-counter market is considered efficient, but less so than the New York
Stock Exchange. Grant, Market Implications of Differential Amounts of Interim Informa-
tion, 18 J. AccT. RESEARCH 255 (1980); Pincus, Information Characteristics of Earnings
Announcements and Stock Market Behavior, 21 J. AccT. RESEARCH 155 (1983). Of course,
some federal securities cases-rule 10b-5 cases in particular-involve securities that are not
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dustries v. Northway, Inc.26 In evaluating the legal sufficiency of
disclosures in a joint proxy statement, the United States Supreme
Court in TSC Industries adopted an objective standard of materi-
ality requiring
a showing of a substantial likelihood that, under all the circum-
stances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance
in the deliberations of the reasonable shareholder. Put another
way, there must be a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of
the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable in-
vestor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of the infor-
mation made available.27
Courts have applied the "total mix" standard in rule 10b-5 cases,28
rule 14a-9 nonmerger proxy litigation,29 section 13(d) cases, 30 and
section 14(e) cases.3 1 The standard presents a court with a mixed
question of law and fact.3 2
The securities law approach to materiality follows closely the
common law concept of materiality that developed in actions for
fraud and misrepresentation. For example, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts defines materiality as the existence or nonexistence
of a fact that would be important to the reasonable actor in deter-
mining a course of action in the transaction in question.33 Com-
mentators have suggested that the common law approach to mate-
publicly traded. The efficient market model cannot be applied in those cases.
26. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
27. Id. at 449.
28. See, e.g., Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S.
Ct. 3255 (1983); Austin v. Loftsgaarden, 675 F.2d 168 (8th Cir. 1982); Healey v. Catalyst
Recovery, 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Harkavy v. Apparel Indus., 571 F.2d 737 (2d Cir.
1978); Joyce v. Joyce Beverages, 571 F.2d 703 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 905 (1978).
29. See, e.g., Galfand v. Chestnutt Corp., 545 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1976).
30. See, e.g., SEC v. Savoy Indus., 587 F.2d 1149 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
913 (1979); Transcon Lines v. A.G. Becker, Inc., 470 F. Supp. 356 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
31. See, e.g., Pacific Realty Trust v. APC Invs., 685 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1982); Radol v.
Thomas, 556 F. Supp. 586 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Allbritton, 516 F. Supp.
164 (D.D.C. 1981).
32. 426 U.S. at 450. The Court in TSC Industries reasoned that the issue of materiality
involved the application of a legal rule to a set of facts. Only if the claimed omissions were
"so obviously important to the investor, that reasonable minds cannot differ on the question
of materiality" is the issue appropriately resolved summarily as a matter of law. Id. (quoting
Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton, 422 F.2d 1124, 1129 (4th Cir. 1970)).
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1965).
[Vol. 25:373
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riality enhances commercial stability because parties cannot avoid
completing a transaction on the basis of a minor or irrelevant mis-
representation. 34 At common law, therefore, a party cannot avoid a
transaction on the basis of collateral omissions or misstatements;
recovery is available, however, for omissions or misstatements
which, if accurate, would justify an actor's decision to take
action. 35
In TSC Industries, the Court adopted the common law approach
and rejected two alternative tests of materiality-the "might" test
and the "outcome-determinative would" test. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in TSC Industries, and
several other courts, had held that a fact was material if the inves-
tor might have considered the information important in making a
particular investment decision.36 The Supreme Court rejected this
lower standard of proof because the standard created an unduly
heavy disclosure burden on management and could frustrate the
policy of full disclosure by burying the investor in an "avalanche"
of irrelevant as well as relevant material.17 The Court also rejected
the requirement that the plaintiff prove that knowledge of the rel-
evant fact actually would have changed the plaintiff's course of
conduct. The Court reasoned that because "such matters are not
subject to determination with certainty" and because the release of
information is within management's control "it is appropriate that
these doubts be resolved in favor of those the statute is designed to
protect." 38
Courts and the SEC have dealt continually with whether a par-
ticular misstatement or omission is material. Disclosure problems
regarding such items as earnings, 9 dividends, 40 control relation-
34. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 108 (4th ed. 1971).
35. 426 U.S. at 449; W. PROSSER, supra note 34, § 108, at 718.
36. Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 438 (1976);
see also Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir.
1974); Ronson Corp. v. Liquifin Aktiengesellschaft, 483 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 870 (1974). For a collection of pre-TSC Industries cases on materiality, see Hewitt,
Developing Concepts of Materiality and Disclosure, 32 Bus. LAW. 887 (1977).
37. 426 U.S. at 448.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d
Cir. 1974); Financial Indus. Fund v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973).
40. See, e.g., In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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ships among related companies,41 inventory and asset values,4 2 of-
fers to buy or sell particular corporate assets,43 pending or
threatened litigation against the corporation, its officers, or direc-
tors,44 potential regulatory limitations on the corporation,45 contin-
gent liabilities-particularly those arising out of environmental or
other governmental regulation, 46 and sensitive payments prob-
lemS4 7 have been found material in specific instances. Materiality
in these cases, as an economic matter, depends on the dollar value
of the event in relation to the size of the company and, with re-
spect to contingent events, the likelihood that the event will
occur.
48
Also essential to implementation of the total mix standard is a
definition of the reasonable investor and an assessment of the ef-
fects of a statement on that hypothetical individual. Proof of mate-
riality involves whether, objectively, a reasonably prudent investor
would have relied on a statement in a given situation.49 Within this
framework, the courts require that disclosures be directed at multi-
ple audiences. A statement that might not mislead a sophisticated
investor might be inadequate for the unsophisticated investor. The
41. See, e.g., TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Mills v. Electric Auto-
Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970).
42. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Ban-
gor Punta Corp., 331 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 924 (1973);
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 99 F. Supp. 808 (D. Del. 1951).
43. See, e.g., Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973); Chris-Craft
Indus. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
44. See, e.g., Rafal v. Geneen, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T
93,505 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See also Gulf & Western Indus. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 476
F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
45. See, e.g., Riggs Nat'l Bank v. Allbritton, 516 F. Supp. 164 (D.D.C. 1981).
46. See, e.g., Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 527 F. Supp. 86 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 665 F.2d
10 (2d Cir. 1981); Securities Act Release No. 5704, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,495 (1976).
47. See, e.g., SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Wis. 1978). But
see Gaines v. Houghton, 645 F.2d 761 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1145 (1981). See
generally Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure of Information Bearing on Management
Integrity and Competency, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 555 (1981). An economic concept of material-
ity usually does not underlie disclosure requirements in this area.
48. E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
49. 426 U.S. at 449.
1984] MATERIALITY AND THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET
approach of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York in Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment
Corp.50 is typical:
[T]he'objectives of full disclosure can be fully achieved only by
complete revelation of facts which would be material to the so-
phisticated investor or the securities professional not just the
average common shareholder. But, at the same time, the pro-
spectus must not slight the less experienced. They are entitled
to have within the four corners of the document an intelligible
description of the transaction.51
In Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co.,62 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit followed a similar
approach and established a "buried facts" doctrine. In an effort to
protect the unsophisticated as well as sophisticated investor, the
court held that, even if the defendant disclosed all the relevant
facts in a single document, the defendant could be liable nonethe-
less for material misrepresentations if important information was
not sufficiently highlighted. 3 Also, failure to present conflicting
facts in a balanced manner may lead a court to find that a material
misstatement has occurred.54 Similarly, the court held that omis-
sions or misstatements not individually material may be material
in the aggregate.5
Courts and commentators have expressed considerable frustra-
tion with the application of the legal test of materiality. One com-
mentator noted that "[t]he rule is clear; it is its application which
is so difficult. ' 56 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec-
50. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). For an analysis of the implications of Felt using the
efficient market model, see infra text accompanying notes 83-94.
51. 332 F. Supp. at 566.
52. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
53. Id. at 773-74. But see Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 602 (5th Cir.)
("It is enough that proxy statements be complete and not misleading in light of the circum-
stances existent and reasonably anticipated at the time distributed."), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
873 (1974).
54. 535 F.2d at 773-74.
55. Id.
56. Kripke, Rule 10b-5 Liability and "Material" "Facts," 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1061, 1069
(1971). See also Fischel, supra note 1; Lorie, supra note 4; Wolfson, A Critique of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission, 30 EMORY L.J. 119 (1981) (definition of materiality
used by the courts and the SEC is an arbitrary verbal formula; instead, materiality should
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ond Circuit has noted that the materiality finding has proven to be
"unpredictable and elusive. '57 A comparison of the legal notions of
materiality and the insights of efficient capital market researchers
may reduce the judicial uncertainty surrounding materiality.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE EFFICIENT MARKET MODEL TO THE TOTAL
MIX TEST OF MATERIALITY
An analysis of leading cases involving the materiality issue dem-
onstrates the utility of efficient capital market research in the de-
velopment of legal rules. The efficient market model brings cer-
tainty and clarity to the materiality issue. An examination of the
facts in the leading cases indicates that the insights of the efficient
market model would have aided the courts in determining the
proper questions to ask, and in identifying the answers to those
questions.
A. Non-Insider Trading Cases and the Materiality Question
In TSC Industries v. Northway, Inc.,5a Northway challenged the
joint merger proxy statement of TSC Industries and National In-
dustries. Northway asserted that the statement failed to disclose
the amount of control that National had over TSC Industries and
the premium that National was offering to TSC shareholders as an
inducement to vote for the transaction. 9
be measured empirically. Information which causes a statistically significant impact on the
price of a stock is material.).
57. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977).
58. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
59. Id. at 442-43. In Northway, Inc. v. TSC Indus., 361 F. Supp. 108 (N.D. Ill. 1973), rev'd
in part, 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 438 (1976), the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied Northway's motion for partial summary
judgment on the issue of liability. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed, holding that certain omissions of fact concerning the degree of control that
National had over TSC Industries, and the favorability of the terms of the transaction, were
material as a matter of law. 512 F.2d at 333-36. The precise issue before the Supreme Court
was whether material questions of fact remained upon which the plaintiff could establish
liability. Application of the efficient market model analysis would have shown that the
plaintiff had not met its burden. Rather, summary judgment for defendants on the two
issues discussed here was appropriate because no issue of fact remained; the information in
question was in the total mix. A federal district court does have authority to grant summary
judgment to the nonmoving party. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56; 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J.
WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE % 56.12 (2d ed. 1983). For further analysis of the inter-
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On the control issue, the proxy statement disclosed that Na-
tional owned thirty-four percent of the outstanding shares of TSC
Industries, and that no other shareholder owned ten percent.6 0 The
proxy statement also revealed that five of TSC's ten directors were
National nominees.6 1 Northway asserted, however, that the proxy
statement should have disclosed that the chairman of the TSC
board was also president and chief executive officer of National,
and that the chairman of the TSC executive committee was Na-
tional's executive vice-president.6 2 Northway also contended that
the proxy statement was deficient because the statement did not
reveal that both TSC Industries and National had indicated in
SEC filings that National might be deemed the parent of TSC
Industries. 3
Whether these additional statements in the proxy materials
could have affected the total mix of information available to TSC
shareholders is the central inquiry. The efficient capital market
model suggests that the statements would not affect the total mix
of available information. The additional information was public,
and thus already in the total mix of data available to TSC share-
holders. The relative price of the stocks of TSC Industries and Na-
tional already would have reflected the possibility that a control-
ling shareholder might offer an "unfair" price for the target
company's stock in a merger transaction. Thus, in determining
whether to vote for the transaction, TSC shareholders needed no
further information on control relationships. The relative price ra-
tio of the two companies' stocks, a perfect substitute for the legal
definition of the total mix, contained the very data that Northway
wanted disclosed.6 4
action of Rule 56 and the use of the efficient market model, see infra text accompanying
notes 142-61. A third issue involved the suggestion that a coordinated buying program had
artificially inflated the price of National stock. The Supreme Court concluded that informa-
tion suggesting market manipulation must be disclosed only if market manipulation in fact
occurred. 426 U.S. at 462.
60. 426 U.S. at 452.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 451.
63. Id.
64. TSC shareholders were asked to make an investment decision-whether to give up
shares in TSC Industries with a certain value in exchange for shares in National. The price
of each company's stock reflected all of the information known to the market concerning
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The joint proxy statement also contained an opinion from an
outside investment banking firm that the transaction was fair to
TSC shareholders.6 5 The banking firm based its opinion, in part,
on the "substantial premium over current market values repre-
sented by the securities being offered to TSC stockholders ... ."6
The securities offered to TSC shareholders comprised a package of
National preferred stock and warrants. The principal dispute be-
tween the parties centered on whether the premium offered could
be characterized as "substantial." This dispute turned on the
proper valuation of the warrants.
Application of the efficient capital market theory would have re-
solved the dispute promptly. National established the exchange ra-
tio on October 9, 1969, and accepting the plaintiffs' proposed valu-
ation of the warrants, the exchange ratio represented a premium of
nineteen percent for TSC preferred stock and fourteen percent for
TSC common stock.17 Not surprisingly, as the exchange ratio infor-
mation became public, the price of TSC stock began to rise. The
defendants argued that when National first mailed the proxy state-
ment on November 7, 1969, TSC stock already reflected the dis-
counted possibility that the premium would be paid. 8
The efficient market model supports the defendants' position.
The model informs the court in two interrelated ways that the de-
fendants offered a substantial premium and made adequate dis-
closure of relevant information. First, the theory supports the de-
fendants' position concerning the measurement of the premium.
The model suggests that as information on the proposed exchange
ratio became public, the price of TSC stock would rise toward the
premium price, discounted by the probability that the transaction
each firm and the firms' interrelationships. The price ratio reflected the total mix of infor-
mation that any shareholder needed to make the investment decision.
65. 426 U.S. at 454.
66. Id. at 455. The investment banking firm of Hornblower & Weeks-Hemphill, Noyes
had rendered a favorable opinion on the fairness of the transaction to TSC shareholders.
The opinion was predicated on the market price of both corporations, the high redemption
price of the National preferred stock, the dividend and debt service requirement of both
corporations, the substantial premium over current market values represented by the securi-
ties being offered to TSC stockholders, and the increased dividend income. Id. at 454-55.
67. Id. at 459 n.18.
68. The fact that National was about to propose a merger at a premium price obviously
affected the value of TSC stock, and hence the total mix.
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ultimately would occur. Thus, the proper date for measuring the
substantiality of the premium was immediately before knowledge
of the exchange ratio became public.
Second, the model depends on the market price reflecting all
available public information in an unbiased manner. If the ex-
change offer is not premised on information not yet in the total
mix, then the market price of the target stock before the offer ac-
curately reflects the approximate value of that stock. The offeror
proposes to pay more than the current market price based on the
belief that the offeror can make more efficient use of the target's
assets. Under this view, any premium over the present market
price results in extra value being transferred from the purchaser to
the tendering shareholder."9 In that sense, any premium over mar-
ket is substantial from the transferring shareholder's perspective.
Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.10 is subject to a similar analysis.
Mills also involved the merger of a publicly traded, partially owned
subsidiary, the Electric Auto-Lite Company, into a publicly traded
parent corporation, the Mergenthaler Linotype Company.71 As in
TSC Industries, the materiality issue revolved around disclosure of
the relationship of Auto-Lite board members to Mergenthaler 2
69. See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Respond-
ing to a Tender Offer, 94 HAnv. L. REv. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Easterbrook & Fischel,
Corporate Control]. But see Brudney, Efficient Markets and Fair Values in Parent Subsid-
iary Mergers, 4 J. CORP. L. 63 (1978); Chazen, Fairness from a Financial Point of View in
Acquisitions of Public Companies: Is Third-Party Sale Value The Appropriate Standard?,
36 Bus. LAW. 1439 (1981). For a critique of Brudney's position see infra note 82.
70. 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
71. Mills involved protracted litigation. In an unreported opinion, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois summarily ruled that the proxy statement
inadequately disclosed the control relationship. The district court later held that the plain-
tiff had shown a sufficient causal relationship between the proxy statement and the consum-
mation of the transaction. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 281 F. Supp. 826 (N.D. Ill. 1967),
rev'd in part, 403 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated, 396 U.S. 375 (1970). The Seventh Cir-
cuit affirmed on the materiality issue but reversed on the causation issue, holding that mate-
rial questions of fact remained unresolved. 403 F.2d at 435. The Supreme Court did not
reach the materiality issue, but held that the plaintiff had proven causation. See 396 U.S. at
381 n.4, 384-85. In an unreported decision on remand, the trial court awarded $1.2 million in
damages and $774,000 in prejudgment interest to the plaintiff class. The Seventh Circuit
then held that the plaintiffs were entitled to no monetary relief. 552 F.2d 1239, 1241, 1250
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977).
72. 403 F.2d at 432.
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The merger proxy statement indicated that the Electric Auto-Lite
board viewed the merger as "fair and equitable. 7' The United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however,
faulted the defendants for not disclosing adequately the interested
status of the subsidiary's board.74 The proxy statement, however,
did disclose that Mergenthaler owned fifty-four percent of the sub-
sidiary. 5 Moreover, the statement revealed that at least four of the
subsidiary's directors were also directors of the parent corporation,
and that other directors of the subsidiary were interested direc-
tors .7  Although all information about control relationships was
publicly available, both lower courts deemed these disclosures in-
sufficient because the proxy statement displayed the subsidiary
board's approval of the merger more prominently than the infor-
mation regarding conflicts of interest.77
The efficient capital market -model, however, rejects the notion
that the position and emphasis given to a particular fact can
amount to a materially misleading disclosure.78 The relative mar-
ket price of the stock of the two companies will reflect any public
disclosure. Thus, the position and emphasis given to the disclosure
of the control relationships could not have caused any injury to
Electric Auto-Lite's shareholders in determining whether to accept
the parent corporation's offer.
The subsequent history of Mills reinforces this point. The Sev-
enth Circuit ultimately held that the plaintiffs were entitled to no
73. Id. at 433.
74. Id. at 432. See also Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976)
(similar emphasis must be given to conflicts of interest of the board of directors in approv-
ing the transaction).
75. 403 F.2d at 433. Companies routinely file such information with the SEC and the
information is also available in reference guides such as Moody's.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 434. The court stated that the board was not free to state its recommendation
and opinion favoring the merger without giving similar emphasis to the relationship between
the directors and the other party to the bargain. Id.
78. Because all public information is part of the total mix, the position or emphasis given
to a fact is irrelevant. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2. Perhaps decisions such as
Gould and Mills can be explained as substantive judicial reviews of the intrinsic fairness of
the transactions at issue, rather than determinations of the adequacy of disclosure. See R.
JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 887-89 (5th ed. 1982).
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monetary relief.79 The court determined that the publicly traded
market price of each company before the merger accurately re-
flected the company's relative "true worth."80 Accepting the mar-
ket value measure, the court calculated that the subsidiary's share-
holders received a 10.5% premium for the tendered shares.8 "
Although the parent company's shareholders also gained as a result
of the merger's synergistic effects, the subsidiary shareholders' gain
exceeded that of the parent company's shareholders.8 2 The court's
79. 552 F.2d at 1249.
80. Id. at 1246-48.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1249. The court calculated these effects according to the proposals for gain
sharing in controlled transactions suggested in Brudney & Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Cor-
porate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARv. L. REV. 297 (1974). Brudney and Chirelstein argue
that, as a matter of state fiduciary law, minority shareholders should share in any gain aris-
ing out of synergies created by the transaction. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate
Control, supra note 69.
Brudney and Chirelstein also argue that the market price of the controlled entity is sys-
tematically distorted around the time of a controlled transaction. They suggest the following
reasons for this phenomenon: uncertainty caused by the ability of the controlling entity to
disadvantage the controlled entity in ways not easily detected or remedied; and systematic
impediments to the flow of information concerning the relative worth of the two companies.
See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CORPORATE FINANCE 689-90 (2d ed. 1979). For an ex-
panded version of the same arguments, see Brudney, surpa note 69. A third reason the price
of the controlled entity might be depressed is that any increment of value derived from the
possibility of a takeover is gone; the control relationship already exists.
These arguments do not mean that the efficient market model of materiality is inapplica-
ble in the controlled transaction setting. As Brudney recognizes, the possibility of harm is
very different from actual harm. This distinction is significant as a matter of federal law. In
Sante Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), the United States Supreme Court required
that actual manipulation or deception be present in rule 10b-5 litigation, rather than con-
structive fraud or unfairness. Thus, Brudney and Chirelstein's first point does not raise a
federal question. The fact that a controlled transaction is involved is fortuitous. Any injury
arises from the existence of the control relationship itself, and not from the transaction or
any disclosure in connection with the relationship. Moreover, as Brudney recognizes, mea-
suring any such "control effect" creates extreme problems of proof regarding valuation.
Brudney attempts to solve this problem by referring the problem to independent evaluators.
Although this might reduce the variability of results as a consequence of litigators' excesses,
no one has demonstrated that a coherent replicable method of valuation exists for publicly
held companies that does not rely primarily on market values.
Critics also overstate the information impediment argument. The market discounts naive
methods of manipulating the relative value of the two firms through devices such as ac-
counting changes. Also, analysts routinely seek information concerning both the parent and
the subsidiary firm, the mechanism by which market efficiency is created. An analyst must
evaluate the activities of the controlled entity to assess the value of the parent company.
This raises serious doubts about whether managers of the parent company have the incen-
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use of market values to resolve the damage question suggests that
the court also should have realized that the market price fully re-
flected the amount of control that the parent had over the subsidi-
ary. The court then could have terminated the litigation at the lia-
bility stage rather than at the damages stage.
Other lower federal courts have had difficulty understanding
how completely and promptly financial markets process informa-
tion. Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp.83 illustrates
this difficulty. Feit involved the takeover of Reliance Insurance
Company by Leasco.s4 Leasco effected the takeover through an ex-
change offer, at a premium price, of Leasco preferred shares and
warrants for the common stock of Reliance. The transaction re-
quired that Leasco file a registration statement and prospectus
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The United States
District Court for the Eastern District of New York ultimately
held that these documents did not disclose adequately material
facts concerning the financial attractiveness of Reliance as a take-
over target.8 5
An understanding and application of the efficient market model
would have led to a different result in Feit. Leasco, a company in
need of large amounts of liquid assets, pursued the transaction be-
cause Reliance had considerable excess cash which Reliance did
not need for its insurance company activities. Such cash is known
in the insurance industry as surplus surplus.86 Insurance company
regulations, however, usually limit the types of noninsurance activ-
ities in which insurance companies may engage. Companies like
tive to withhold information routinely about the subsidiary. Such a tactic would reduce the
value of the parent company as well, however, and would subject the parent company to
increased takeover threats. Finally, actual manipulative and deceptive devices are subject to
legal control. Both the efficient market approach and the Brudney position recognize the
utility of such legal devices. The efficient market model only provides a method to identify
the occurrence of such events.
83. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
84. Id. at 549-50.
85. Id. at 574. If the offeror discovers the takeover value of the target firm from publicly
available data, a requirement that the offeror inform the target shareholders of those facts
seems anomalous. No fiduciary relationship exists, and a court should allow the offeror to
benefit from the value of its discovery.
86. Required surplus is the amount of cash an insurance company needs to cover declines
in asset values and losses and expenses greater than those ordinarily expected. Surplus sur-
plus is any retained amount greater than the amount needed for required surplus.
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Leasco could gain access to the surplus surplus through a merger,
however, and free these sums from regulatory restrictions by form-
ing holding companies with operating insurance subsidiaries.8 7
A widely distributed industry report used by securities analysts
triggered Leasco's specific interest in purchasing Reliance. 8 The
report discussed the concept of surplus surplus and methods by
which this sum could be made available for noninsurance uses. A
publicly available report by the New York Department of Insur-
ance also contributed to Leasco's interest in Reliance as a takeover
target.8 9
Despite the public nature of the information in question, the
court faulted Leasco for failing to disclose the size and nature of
the available surplus surplus. The court held that "[a] substantial
possibility [existed] that the Reliance shares were significantly un-
dervalued in the market because of the general traders' ignorance
of the magnitude of the possible surplus surplus."90 The court rea-
soned that disclosure of the information, when subjected to both
professional and nonprofessional analysis, might have raised the
price of Reliance stock so that the premium offered would have
been reduced or eliminated. 91
The court's conclusion in Feit is fundamentally inconsistent with
the efficient market model. The market price of a security fully
and promptly reflects publicly available information in an unbi-
ased manner. The court found that Leasco developed internal esti-
mates of the amount of the Reliance surplus surplus from public
information.2 Therefore, the market price of Reliance stock un-
doubtedly reflected the discounted present value of the surplus
surplus if converted to noninsurance uses. The efficient market
model suggests that purchasers and sellers either knew, or through
the price signalling mechanism, should have known that the availa-
bility of surplus surplus made Reliance a potential takeover target.
If this notion is correct, then the court's belief that the market
undervalued Reliance's stock is incorrect. Leasco was not purchas-
87. 332 F. Supp. at 551.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 572.
91. Id. at 572-73.
92. Id. at 551.
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ing Reliance on the basis of material inside information, and the
market could not have undervalued Reliance stock.
Specific evidence in the Feit record supports this theoretical in-
sight of the efficient market model. The chief executive officer of
Reliance testified that securities analysts knew of the attractive-
ness of insurance companies like Reliance as takeover targets
months before the initial Leasco offer." Many mutual funds had
invested in Reliance in anticipation of a takeover bid. 4 Thus,
whether specific shareholders failed to discern the significance of
Reliance's surplus surplus, the general market "knew" the relevant
facts. Leasco's offer included a premium above the market price,
which reflected the value of the surplus surplus, and Leasco did
not withhold material information from investors who tendered
their shares.
In Del Noce v. Delyar Corp.,95 the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York held that a merger proxy
statement contained materially misleading information because the
statement falsely indicated that the merging companies-Hess Oil
and Chemical Corporation and Amerada Petroleum Corpora-
tion-considered relative asset values in establishing the exchange
ratio. 6 The court concluded that the relative value of the compa-
nies' assets played no significant part in the merger negotiations .9
Although the parties considered past, present, and estimated fu-
ture earnings, relative market prices, and dividend rates in estab-
lishing an exchange ratio, the court nevertheless found the proxy
statement materially misleading.9 '
The efficient market model suggests that no injury resulted from
the alleged misstatement, and thus no material misstatement oc-
curred. Because the companies' securities were publicly traded, in-
formation concerning assets was available to the marketplace and
the relative market price of the two companies should have re-
93. Id. at 556.
94. Id.
95. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,670 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Del
Noce was subsequently settled for up to $4 million, 78 F.R.D. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), plus an
additional $778,000 in legal fees. 457 F. Supp. 1051 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
96. [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) at 90,290, 90,300.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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flected this information. In particular, information concerning the
asset value of petroleum reserves was generally available. The com-
panies, by explictly considering relative market prices, indirectly
considered asset values in establishing the exchange ratio. More-
over, shareholders of the companies had all the relevant informa-
tion concerning assets through the price signalling mechanism. The
court partially recognized this analysis when the court stated that
no misstatement occurred concerning the nature or value of the
securities offered to Amerada shareholders. 99 Application of the ef-
ficient market model by the court would have indicated that the
price signalling mechanism also revealed the asset value and going
concern value of the stock tendered by Amerada's shareholders.
The court erred in reasoning that more accurate evidence of Amer-
ada's value could be derived apart from the value reached by the
market. Absent material inside information, the efficient market
model posits that such a result is impossible. Instead, the model
operates on the notion that the total mix of information contained
all relevant information concerning Amerada's assets. Thus, from
the model's perspective, the allegedly incorrect statement was not
false or, if technically incorrect, was not material.1 00
Another leading merger case, Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc.,10 1
demonstrates the difficulties some courts have with ascertaining
the manner by which the market processes information. Skogmo, a
substantial retailing firm, purchased control of GOA, the largest
outdoor advertising firm in the United States. Skogmo then began
liquidating GOA's advertising plants at prices substantially above
the plants' book values.102 Skogmo subsequently merged with
99. Id.
100. Cf. supra note 64 and accompanying text.
101. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). The lower court opinions are reported at 298 F. Supp.
66 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); 332 F. Supp. 644 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); and 348 F. Supp. 979 (E.D.N.Y.
1972), aff'd and modified, 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973). For an early perceptive analysis of
Gerstle, see Manne, Accounting and the Administrative Law Aspects of Gerstle v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 15 N.Y.L.F. 304 (1969). Manne also applies the efficient market model to the
facts of Gerstle and reaches the same conclusions as those stated in this Article. As with
much current application of modem financial theory to corporate law, Professor Manne's
approach to materiality is seminal.
102. GOA had sold plants with a book value of $11 million for $33 million, and expert
appraisals indicated that Skogmo could sell other plants at equally large premiums over
book value.
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GOA, and holders of GOA common stock received Skogmo pre-
ferred shares. The merger proxy statement revealed that Skogmo
would continue "the policy of considering offers for the sale to ac-
ceptable prospective purchasers of outdoor advertising
branches ... - The proxy statement also disclosed the profits
obtained from prior sales. 104 By extrapolation, securities analysts
should have realized that considerable profits might result from
sales of the remaining plants. In fact, one analyst made such a cal-
culation and objected to the SEC that the information supporting
these calculations should be highlighted in the proxy statement. 0 5
The court criticized Skogmo for failing to disclose explicitly the
"active" nature of Skogmo's efforts to sell off GOA assets, a fact
that "might have been picked up by the sensitive antennae of in-
vestment analysts."' 0' Despite the ability of securities analysts to
discern the business plans of Skogmo and to approximate the ap-
preciated value of the underlying assets, the court concluded that a
material omission resulted from Skogmo's failure to disclose "ac-
tive" plans.10 7 Apparently, the court believed that the failure to
disclose resulted in an undervaluation of GOA stock because the
market price did not reflect the appreciated value of the underly-
ing assets. 08 The court thus reasoned that GOA shareholders
might have preferred to participate directly in the profits derived
from the plant sales, rather than participate in the merger transac-
tion. 109 In essence, the court concluded that the information con-
cerning the appreciated asset base was akin to inside information.
103. 478 F.2d at 1288.
104. Id. A note to the financial statements also explained that Skogmo was carrying its
stake in GOA at above book value, reflecting the potential appreciated value of the unsold
plants.
105. Id. Allyn Corp. v. Hartford Nat'l Corp., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 98,646 (D. Conn. 1982), presents the same problems. In Allyn, the court faulted a
merger proxy statement that did not include information well known for not including in-
formation that was well known by the investment community. The court also held that the
proxy statement was materially false because it did not give equal prominence to uncertain-
ties concerning increased dividends and the merging firms' belief that these increased pay-
ments were possible. Both holdings ignore the manner in which the market processes
information.
106. 478 F.2d at 1297.
107. Id. at 1302-03.
108. But see supra text accompanying note 17.
109. 478 F.2d at 1303.
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In this respect, the court erred. Applying the efficient market
model to the facts in Gerstie, the investment community appar-
ently was aware of the appreciated value of the assets. The facts
indicate that the "sensitive antennae" of securities analysts al-
ready had perceived the relevant information. 110 Given this percep-
tion, the price of GOA stock fully reflected the appreciated value
of GOA assets. Because Skogmo offered a premium over this price,
the premium was "real,"-' and the GOA stock was not underval-
ued. The premium price fully reflected the potential profits from
asset sales. The proxy statement thus was not flawed, nor could
the supposed failure to disclose the active nature of the plant sale
negotiations have misled GOA shareholders.
Valente v. Pepsico, Inc.112 demonstrates another judicial failure
to appreciate the efficient processing of public information by the
market. Valente involved a tender offer by the parent corporation,
Pepsico, for the shares of a controlled subsidiary, Wilson Sporting
Goods. Before the transaction, outside shareholders partially
owned Wilson, although Pepsico owned more than eighty-eight
percent of Wilson's common stock." 3 When Pepsico initially ob-
tained a seventy-five percent block of Wilson stock, Pepsico an-
nounced an intent to purchase the remaining outstanding securi-
ties of Wilson. Pepsico pursued the merger transaction in
furtherance of that goal and offered the same price that Pepsico
had paid for its initial block of stock.114
The plaintiffs alleged that Pepsico's tender offer documents were
materially misleading because the documents failed to disclose the
110. Id. at 1297.
111. For a contrary view of Gerstle, see Comment, Utilization of Investment Analysis
Principles in the Development of Disclosure Policy Under the Federal Securities Laws, 25
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 292 (1977). The author starts with the correct premise that a court should
define materiality by reference to the economic model, and insightfully works through the
analysis in other contexts such as reliance and causation. The author's analysis of Gerstle,
however, is flawed. The author fails to consider that the market in Gerstle was aware of
Skogmo's plans for liquidation and would have factored these plans into the relative market
prices. The plaintiffs' individual knowledge is irrelevant. Thus, the author's conclusion that
the plaintiff was unable to value the terms of the merger properly is incorrect.
112. 454 F. Supp. 1228 (D. Del. 1978). Following the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware, the parties settled the case and established a fund which
obligated the defendants to pay up to $4.5 million. 89 F.R.D. 352 (D. Del. 1981).
113. 454 F. Supp. at 1235.
114. Id.
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minority shareholders' appraisal rights, the amount of control Pep-
sico had over Wilson, and Wilson's significant improvement in
earnings. 115 In addition, the plaintiffs asserted that Pepsico should
have disclosed that its purchase plans for the outstanding shares
placed a cap on the market price of Wilson shares."1 " The United
States District Court for the District of Delaware held that the
failure to disclose appraisal rights was a material omission as a
matter of law, that factual disputes precluded summary judgment
on the control and price cap issues, and that the failure to disclose
the earnings information in the tender offer materials was immate-
rial as a matter of law.""
The court's ruling on the earnings issue is consistent with the
efficient capital market model. Between the time of Pepsico's ac-
quisition of the majority interest in Wilson and the time of the
merger in 1972, Wilson's earnings improved from a loss situation to
a substantial profit. The plaintiffs maintained that this informa-
tion should have been included in the tender offer materials but
the court rejected the assertion. The court stated that readily
available financial information need not be repeated in tender offer
documents.1 ' This position is consistent with the efficient capital
market model because repeating public information about Wilson's
earnings could not have added any new information to the total
mix.1 9
115. Id. at 1239. Several other issues were also before the court. The plaintiffs challenged
disclosure in connection with a tender for certain Wilson debentures and argued that the
tender offer documents should have disclosed the redemption price. The court rejected this
claim because Wilson had no intention to redeem the debentures. In addition, the possible
redemption price was publicly available and the market price of the debentures would have
reflected the redemption price. Thus, the court properly concluded that this information
was not material. The court held that questions of fact remained with respect to disclosure
of the treatment of employee option holders in the transaction. Although other documents
disclosed much of the information to Wilson shareholders, the court believed that these
disclosures possibly were not in the total mix under the "buried facts" doctrine. This ap-
proach ignores the basic tenets of the efficient market model. Finally, the court held that
material questions of fact remained concerning the price cap issue and the issue of whether
Pepsico had to disclose in the tender offer materials the benefits of the transaction to Pep-
sico. These issues do not affect the economic benefit of the transaction for Wilson share-
holders and thus are not subject to analysis under the approach suggested here.
116. Id. at 1245.
117. Id. at 1256.
118. Id. at 1243.
119. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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If the efficient market model had been the basis of the court's
opinion, summary judgment for the defendants would have been
appropriate on the control issue. Instead, the court held that issues
of fact remained. The tender offer materials disclosed that Pepsico
already owned 88.1% of Wilson. Other public documents, such as
annual reports, contained information concerning the amount of
control Pepsico had over Wilson, including Pepsico's provision of
management services to Wilson.12 0 As in Mills, the market already
knew that Pepsico controlled Wilson.
On the issue of appraisal rights, the defendants argued that the
shareholders should have been on notice of their statutory rights of
appraisal. 2 ' This argument essentially is based on the efficient
market model because the statutory rights that a shareholder may
enjoy are reflected in the price of a security.122 The court con-
cluded, however, that the tender offer materials were misleading
because the documents would have caused the reasonable share-
holder to infer that appraisal rights were unavailable.1 23 This con-
clusion is correct only if the tender offer materials added misinfor-
mation to the total mix of information. If this had occurred, the
price of Wilson stock should have reflected the new information.
Rather than assuming such a conclusion based on linguistic argu-
ments,1 24 the court should have attempted to observe the price ef-
fect directly.1 25 Valente thus exemplifies the manner in which the
efficient market model enables courts to analyze properly the ma-
teriality issue. Rather than rely on ad hoc judgments concerning
120. 454 F. Supp. at 1242.
121. Id. at 1240 n.17.
122. The legal environment in which a transaction occurs is as much a fact as operational
data. See Spielman v. General Host Corp., 538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976).
123. 454 F. Supp. at 1240 n.17.
124. Another example of this linguistic problem is presented by Schlesinger Inv. Partner-
ship v. Fluor Corp., 671 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1982). In Schlesinger, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that a factual dispute existed concerning whether
tender offer documents sufficiently disclosed that the proration period was shorter than the
period during which the tender offer would remain open. The tender offer documents, how-
ever, contained the precise disclosure information required by § 14(d)(6) of the Williams
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1982). 671 F.2d at 741. The legal requirement with respect to
proration and its disclosure by the offeror would be reflected in the market price of the
target firm.
125. For a discussion of the methodological issues in using price movements to answer the
materiality question, see infra note 172.
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possible shareholder reactions to certain information, the use of
the model focuses the court's inquiry on the actual processing and
use of information by investors.
Fisher v. Plessey Co. Ltd.126 arose out of a self-tender offer by
Plessey for its debentures at a substantial premium over market
price. The plaintiff asserted that the tender offer disclosure docu-
ments were materially misleading because the documents failed to
disclose adequately Plessey's improved performance resulting from
increased sales and because the documents failed to disclose Ples-
sey's improved market position that resulted from the sale of two
unprofitable subsidiaries. 127 The defendants argued that the total
mix contained the information as the result of widespread press
coverage in the United Kingdom and more limited coverage in the
United States. 128 The defendants, explicitly relying on the efficient
market model, moved for summary judgment.129
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York rejected the defendants' motion, but accepted the argu-
ment that "'there is no duty to disclose information to one who
reasonably should already be aware of it.' ",is The court held that
material questions of fact existed concerning the debenture hold-
ers' awareness of the information from sources other than the
tender offer materials. The court viewed the problem as involving
whether an individual debenture holder actually had seen, or rea-
sonably should have seen, the information in question, and not
whether the market price already reflected the information."'1 This
approach misses the thrust of the defendants' efficient market
model argument. Not every market participant needs to have ac-
cess to all available information. If enough participants have access
to the information, their trading will affect the equilibrium price.
The price signalling mechanism then gives the other market par-
126. 559 F. Supp. 442 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). The plaintiff asserted claims for relief under
§§ 10(b), 13(e), and 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act.
127. 559 F. Supp. at 444.
128. Id. at 445.
129. Id. at 444. The court characterized the defendants' motion as "blunderbuss." Id. at
443. This characterization could arise only from a misunderstanding of the importance of
the efficient market model in securities litigation.
130. Id. at 445 (quoting Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 736 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968)).
131. 559 F. Supp. at 446.
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ticipants access to the same information. The question the court
should have asked was whether disclosures in Great Britain would
filter into the total mix of information in the United States. In-
stead, the court considered whether individual market participants
in the United States were aware of the information which was
common knowledge in Great Britain.
In Fisher, the information must have reached investors in the
United States. Plessey ordinary stock was traded on the London
Stock Exchange, a market in which the efficient market model also
applies. 13 2 The London Stock Exchange price would have reflected
the information revealed in Great Britain. Investors on the New
York Stock Exchange indirectly traded Plessey stock through the
mechanism of American Depository Receipts.133 An investor could
convert American Depository Receipts on a one-for-one basis for
Plessey ordinary stock. Arbitrage then would eliminate any differ-
ence in the price of the stock on each exchange.134 The disclosure
in Great Britain would have affected the market price of the de-
bentures in the United States through the same process. Because
an investor could convert the debentures into American Depository
Receipts, and then into Plessey ordinary stock, any change in the
value of Plessey ordinary stock on the London Exchange would
have affected the price of the debentures promptly.
The foregoing analysis also demonstrates the flaw in the court's
analysis of the fairness of price issue. The plaintiff suggested that
the offering documents were materially misleading because man-
agement asserted that the offer was fair, knowing that the price of
the debentures would rise. 35 The court believed that reliance on
the efficient market model to demonstrate that no issue concerning
the fairness of the price existed was "obvious bootstrapping of ar-
guments," even if the operations information was publicly availa-
ble.13 6 The market, however, had evaluated public information on
132. See M. FIRTH, supra note 8; Cowton & Garod, supra note 2. See also Guy, The
Performance of the British Investment Trust Industry, 33 J. FIN. 443 (1978).
133. 559 F. Supp. at 443.
134. Arbitrage is "the act of simultaneously purchasing foreign exchange, securities, com-
modities or other goods in one market and selling them in another market at a higher
price." THE McGRAw-HELL DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONoMics 25 (2d ed. 1973).
135. 559 F. Supp. at 444.
136. Id. at 448.
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the company's performance in establishing the market price. The
premium that Plessey offered exceeded that price. A court could
consider such a price unfair only if the company had material in-
side information not yet in the total mix. The operations informa-
tion was not material inside information because the data was
available in Great Britain. Thus, the disclosure question and the
fairness question are fundamentally linked. If the information in
question was in the total mix, then fairness was not an issue.
The plaintiff also asserted that the tender offer documents
should have included earnings data and earnings projections. 137
The court concluded that the defendants had a duty to disclose
preliminary earnings information, but that the defendants had no
duty to disclose projections. 138 The efficient market model indi-
cates that both earnings data a3 9 and management projections 40 do
contain new information. Thus, if management delayed the release
of new earnings data until the tender offer was complete, then
trading on material inside information did occur. Absent compel-
ling reasons to the contrary, management's offer to repurchase the
company's securities also might trigger a requirement to disclose
projections of future earnings.14 ' Application of the efficient mar-
137. Id. at 450.
138. Id.
139. Joy, Litzenberger & McEnally, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to Announcements
of Unanticipated Changes in Quarterly Earnings, 15 J. AccT. RESEARCH 207 (1977); Morse,
Price and Trading Volume Reaction Surrounding Earnings Announcements: A Closer Ex-
amination, 19 J. ACT. RESEARCH 374 (1981). Interim earnings information contains more
significant information.
140. Patell, Corporate Forecasts of Earnings Per Share and Stock Price Behavior: Em-
pirical Tests, 14 J. AccT. RESEARCH 246 (1976); Penman, An Empirical Investigation of the
Voluntary Disclosure of Corporate Earnings Forecasts, 18 J. AcCr. RESEARCH 132 (1980);
Penman, supra note 23.
141. A dispute existed in the record concerning the nature and certainty of the earnings
and the projections of earnings information. Only the existence of reliable, reasonably firm
information should trigger any legal obligation to disclose projections. If such an obligation
to disclose projections existed, this uncertainty would preclude summary judgment. For a
discussion of an affirmative duty to disclose projections, see Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the
Corporation's Affirmative Duty to Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979). See also Ruder, Dis-
closure of Financial Projections-Developments, Problems, and Techniques, in PRACTICING
LAW INSTrrrUrE, FnFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECUwrrmS REGULATION (1974). These commen-
tators recognize the difficulties inherent in a projections disclosure requirement. By their
nature, projections are subject to considerable uncertainty and are often revised. In addi-
tion, disclosure of sensitive information concerning a corporation's future business plans
may commercially disadvantage the corporation under certain circumstances. Also, a corpo-
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ket model thus provides some support for the court's ruling on the
earnings and projections issues, but makes summary judgment ap-
propriate on the disclosure of operations issue.
Application of the efficient market model at the summary judg-
ment stage presents difficult problems due to the interplay be-
tween substance and procedure. Jones u. National Distillers &
Chemical Corp.142 demonstrates the problem. Summary judgment
requires that no material questions of fact exist.143 In Jones, the
defendants argued that summary judgment was appropriate be-
cause the market value of the shares exchanged in a merger was
substantially less than the premium price that the minority share-
holders received. 144 On the day before the announcement of the
proposed merger, the stock of the target firm-Almaden-traded
at $5.875. In the full year before the announcement, the stock
traded between $5.50 and $8.50.14§ National offered $12.25 per
share for the outstanding stock. The plaintiffs countered with the
affidavit of an expert who challenged the accuracy of the market
value of the target company and claimed that the Almaden stock
was worth in excess of $12.25.140
ration might be subject to liability for releasing a projection that later proves erroneous. See
Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974); Beecher v. Able, 374 F.
Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). In Marx, a corporate officer orally qualified a published earnings
projection before a major securities analyst group to reflect the uncertainty of the projec-
tion. The uncertainty of the projection, therefore, was in the total mix. The Ninth Circuit
ignored this fact in holding that the corporation was potentially liable for the erroneous
projection. The SEC's safe harbor rule for projections ameliorates these problems only par-
tially. See Securities Act Release No. 6084, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
82,117 (1979). See also Securities Act Release No. 5992, Guides For Disclosure of Projec-
tions of Future Economic Performance [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
81,756 (1978). Under the safe harbor rule, no liability attaches to the release of a forward
looking statement made in good faith with a reasonable basis.
142. 484 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
143. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
144. 484 F. Supp. at 683.
145. Almaden was traded on the Pacific Stock Exchange and in the over-the-counter mar-
ket. Two million shares were in the hands of approximately 22,000 shareholders. During
1975 and 1976, nearly 900,000 shares of Almaden were traded; more than 90,000 shares were
traded in the first quarter of 1977-the quarter preceding the transaction. Defendant's
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Second Amended Complaint at 10, 62.
146. When Almaden first offered stock to the public in 1972, the stock sold for $20 per
share. Id. at 13. Perhaps the comparison between the original issue price and the redemp-
tion price led the court to conclude that questions of fact existed concerning the accuracy of
the market price of Almaden stock and the fairness of the redemption price. Arguably, a
1984]
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The major dispute between the parties was whether the proxy
statement adequately disclosed Almaden's earnings forecast. The
proxy statement revealed that Almaden's projected earnings for
the next year were $5,900,000. The company in fact earned
$6,187,000 for the year, a difference of less than three cents per
share. 147 The projected earnings figure assumed that Almaden's
profits would improve in part because the company was switching
from selling wine in half-gallon bottles to magnums. The proxy
statement, however, did not reveal this fact explictly. The proxy
statement did reveal that prices of California wines might increase
because of a relatively small grape crop. 14 Also, securities analysts
who followed Almaden were aware that the shift to magnums
might improve the company's profit margin and volume of sales. 149
Despite this evidence, plaintiff's expert witness testified that the
Almaden market price was unreliable because the market had not
been informed completely of the positive effect that the conversion
to magnums would have on Almaden and because management
was giving up current earnings for present gains in market share. 150
A court that has accepted the efficient market model would reject
the first argument. The earnings projection implictly contained the
information concerning the magnum conversion and analysts were
aware of the potential profits from the conversion. The market
price of the company, therefore, reflected fully any benefits derived
from the conversion. With respect to the market share allegation,
Almaden's prices and its competitors' prices were publicly availa-
ble. If Almaden had adopted a strategy of trading current profits
for market share, the publicly available nature of Almaden's prices
firm may act unfairly in repurchasing shares of a controlled subsidiary at prices substan-
tially below the original issue price. The original issue price, however, should not have influ-
enced the court's analysis of the transaction. The drop in market price from $20 per share to
$5.875 could be explained as the consequence of the aggregate drop in stock prices generally
and wine stocks specifically. This does not indicate that the market price for Almaden was
inaccurate, but rather quite the opposite. As new information developed about the economy
and the specific industry in which Almaden operated, the price of the stock reacted accord-
ingly. See King, Market and Industry Factors in Stock Price Behavior, 39 J. Bus. 139
(1966).
147. See Defendant's Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion to Dismiss the Second
Amended Complaint at 21.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. 484 F. Supp. at 683.
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would inform the market of Almaden's strategy. The price of the
stock would reflect the discounted present value of the strategy.
If the court had approached the problem in light of the efficient
market model, the court would have ignored the proferred expert
opinion because no issue of material fact existed. Summary judg-
ment then would have been appropriate. Jones, therefore, turns on
whether an expert opinion that contradicts the efficient market
model raises a genuine issue of fact. The court concluded that such
an affidavit created a jury issue.151 The court's holding requires
that a litigant prove that the efficient market model is correct and
that the model applies to the security in question. This approach
may encourage the settlement of cases that lack merit by increas-
ing the risk and expense of litigation. 52 Properly interpreted, how-
ever, rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure does not re-
quire the approach that the court adopted in Jones. An expert
opinion that departs from the norms of accepted scholarship does
not raise questions of material fact.153 The expert opinion in Jones
represents such a departure.
Wechsler v. Steinberg"5 also highlights the problem of narrowly
construing the concept of total mix in a summary judgment deter-
mination. Wechsler arose out of the Reliance-Leasco merger.155 In
consummating the transaction, Leasco agreed to repurchase the
stock of several institutional investors or to guarantee a resale
price for the securities purchased from Leasco. In addition, Leasco
promised to pay the institutional investors substantial monthly
fees until the purchased securities were resold. The plaintiffs as-
serted that these guarantees resulted in major contingent liabilities
which Leasco's annual reports inadequately disclosed.156 The de-
fendants responded that other documents-including SEC filings,
NYSE listing documents, newspaper reports, and stock analyst re-
151. Id.
152. For example, Jones was settled for $750,000-$190,000 of which went to the plain-
tiffs' lawyers. [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 97,288 (S.D.N.Y.
1980). Del Noce and Valente also were settled. See supra notes 95 & 112.
153. Merit Motors v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666 (D.C. Cir. "1977).
154. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,449 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
156. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) at 99,274.
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ports-disclosed the operative facts.15 Although conceding that
the SEC documents were complete, the plaintiffs asserted that
these documents were "so fragmented as to inhibit com-
prehension. 15 8
The court, although seemingly accepting that one should evalu-
ate the adequacy of disclosure against the backdrop of all informa-
tion available to the market, held that questions of fact existed
regarding the adequacy of disclosure."' The court accepted the
plaintiffs' argument that, under certain circumstances, the market
might not digest publicly available information.160 According to the
efficient market model, however, the price of Leasco stock did re-
flect all publicly available information. Summary judgment was ap-
propriate, therefore, particularly because the plaintiffs attempted
to prove individual reliance through market reliance. The doctrine
of market reliance depends on a belief in the efficient market
model."6
In contrast to the cases discussed previously, other courts take a
broader view of the market's ability to process information. In de-
fining the total mix, these courts hold that determining the ade-
quacy of a statement requires a court explicitly to consider previ-
ously disclosed facts.1 e2 Each communication need not disclose all
material facts to avoid violating the securities laws. 16 3 These courts
recognize that other sources of information, such as the trade
157. Id.
158. Id. at 99,275.
159. Id. at 99,276.
160. Id. at 99,275.
161. See Comment, The Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1143 (1982).
The commentator argues that the fraud on the market theory operates on the assumption
that market prices respond to disseminated and undisseminated information about a com-
pany. If the information affects the equilibrium price, then even traders who are not explic-
itly aware of the information are affected. See also Fischel, supra note 1.
162. See, e.g., Spielman v. General Host Corp., 402 F. Supp. 190 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), af'd,
538 F.2d 39 (2d Cir. 1976). Spielman involved a tender offer contest between General Host
Corp. and Greyhound Corp. for control of Armour & Co. The plaintiffs asserted that Gen-
eral Host's tender offer materials were misleading in two respects: failure to disclose General
Host's ability to meet all cash needs from internally generated funds; and failure to disclose
General Host's ability to gain immediate control of Armour. These contentions were the
subject of considerable discussion in the media during the tender offer. The court held,
therefore, that the information was in the total mix. The efficient market model supports
the holding in Spielman.
163. 402 F. Supp. 190.
[Vol. 25:373
1984] MATERIALITY AND THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET 407
press, newspapers, and the electronic media, can affect the total
mix.164 One need not "disclose 'that which had been publicly pro-
claimed in several ways on several occasions'" because such infor-
mation is already "sufficiently 'in the public domain.' "1165 The effi-
cient market model supports this approach because the model
asserts that the market reacts to new information without regard
to the source.
Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp.166 demonstrates a
court's intuitive understanding of the model. Rockwood was one of
several companies that leased the IBM System/360 generation of
computers to end users. In 1970, IBM publicly announced the in-
troduction of a new System/370 generation of computers.161 Be-
cause of technological improvements, the industry concluded that
the improved cost/performance ratio of this product line would
provide computer customers with greater economic efficiency. The
trade press widely noted this fact and the possible impact on com-
puter leasing firms like Rockwood."6 8 Computer leasing firms faced
an uncertain financial future because the new generation of com-
puters could reduce the useful life of the System/360 units on hand
and the expected rental income from the units.
The plaintiffs asserted that Rockwood's annual report inade-
quately disclosed facts concerning the effect on the company of the
new generation of computers."6 9 The wide dissemination of the
System/370 information led the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to conclude that detailed dis-
closure of these facts by Rockwood was unnecessary. The court
stated that the market would have "already been well aware of any
uncertainty concerning the Company's future. ' 170 To strengthen its
conclusion, the court noted that publication of the allegedly un-
duly optimistic statements in the annual report had not affected
164. See Beissinger v. Rockwood Computer Corp., 529 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
165. Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.) (quoting Johnson v.
Wiggs, 443 F.2d 803, 806 (5th Cir. 1971)), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 579 (1974).
166. 529 F. Supp. 770 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
167. Id. at 775.
168. Id. at 775-76.
169. Id. at 778.
170. Id. at 782. The information was available from numerous articles in Com-
puterworld-the leading industry trade paper, in IBM announcements, and in Form 10-K
on file with the SEC.
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the price of Rockwood stock. The court reasoned that, if the state-
ments were material, a price movement would have occurred. 171
Because no movement occurred, the statements in question did not
affect the total mix. A conclusion that particular statements were
not material because of a lack of price movement is consistent with
the efficient capital market model. New information alters the
equilibrium price; if the equilibrium price remains stable, then the
statement probably disclosed no new information. 172
Another example of the model's usefulness in resolving material-
ity issues is Seaboard World Airlines v. Tiger International.73 In
Seaboard, Tiger made a cash tender offer of $12.30 per share for
9.4% of the outstanding common stock of Seaboard. The offer
would have raised Tiger's holdings in Seaboard to twenty-five per-
cent.' 7 4 Before Tiger began purchasing Seaboard's stock, Seaboard
stock was trading at approximately $4 per share. Seaboard asserted
that its liquidation value approached $20 per share and that Ti-
ger's statement assailing the $20 figure was materially mislead-
ing. 7 5 If the Tiger statement was misleading, Tiger would have vi-
olated section 14(e) of the Williams Act because the statement was
171. Id.
172. A court should consider the price movements of the general market when testing for
new information through the price movements of a particular stock. For a description of this
methodology,, see Comment, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Ac-
tively Traded Securities, 26 STAN. L. REv. 371 (1974). The Comment develops a method of
creating an "abnormal performance index" (API). This technique is the primary method
researchers use to analyze the operation of financial markets. The Comment establishes a
model for the given return of a security, including firm specific and market-wide data. The
price movement of the stock is measured for a period of normal activity, thus establishing a
control period uncontaminated by the alleged violation. Statistical tests are then run on the
movement of the price of the stock for the period of alleged manipulation or disclosure
violations. These tests reveal whether the alleged illegal conduct created any abnormal price
movement and, if so, the magnitude. See also Ohlson, Residual (API) Analysis and the
Private Value of Information, 17 J. AcCr. RESEARCH 506 (1979); Schwert, Using Financial
Data to Measure Effects of Regulation, 24 J. LAW & ECON. 121 (1981). The API is useful
not only for measuring damages, therefore, but for finding liability as well. If the API indi-
cates no abnormal activity, then the market probably was aware of the information in ques-
tion or the information was not of sufficient magnitude to change the equilibrium price.
Thus, the use of price movements in Rockwood to show materiality was a step in the right
direction. To aid in the materiality analysis, courts should use the more complete API
analysis.
173. 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1979).
174. Id. at 357.
175. Id. at 361.
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made in connection with a tender offer.1 76
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ex-
plicitly relied on the efficient market model in holding that no ma-
terial misrepresentation occurred. 17 Because Seaboard was traded
broadly on a national securities exchange, the court stated that
Seaboard's market value accurately represented the corporation's
value -7 8 -at least as a going concern.179 Thus, Tiger's statement
challenging the $20 figure was not misleading, particularly in light
of Seaboard's trading history. Moreover, the court considered a
broad information set in determining the impact of the dispute
over the liquidation value of Seaboard's assets on the reasonable
investor. The court recognized that, in addition to specific state-
ments in the tender offer documents, shareholders also had access
to other information. Documents filed with the SEC nine months
before commencement of the tender offer completely disclosed the
nature of the dispute between Tiger and Seaboard, and Seaboard's
assertion that the $20 figure was accurate. 80 Thus, the liquidation
value dispute was in the public domain and the price of Seaboard
stock reflected that dispute.
The market had the opportunity to assess whether Seaboard's
proposed valuation method was realistic in the context of a battle
for corporate control. Market participants had concluded that Sea-
board's valuation figure was unrealistic because the price of the
stock did not rise to the $20 figure. This result is not surprising.
Securities analysts were familiar with Seaboard's assets, and were
in a good position to evaluate whether liquidation would occur and
the price that the assets would bring in liquidation. Thus, the
court's use of the efficient market model resulted in a focused in-
quiry and led to the proper result.
In certain instances, application of the model requires the bal-
176. Id. at 360 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976)).
177. Id. at 361-62.
178. Id. at 362.
179. The court's acceptance of the market value of the Seaboard stock as reflecting only
the corporation's value as a going concern is too limited. Under the efficient market model,
the market price of a firm's stock measures the entire value of the firm, from whatever
source. The market price of the stock reflects going concern value, takeover value, and liqui-
dation value.
180. Id. at 364.
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ancing of competing reasonable views of the total mix. Franklin
Life Insurance Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co."s' involved Com-
monwealth Edison's decision to redeem an issue of preferred stock.
The plaintiffs asserted that the prospectus accompanying the issu-
ance of the stock was materially misleading. Plaintiffs interpreted
the prospectus as stating that the issuer could not redeem the
stock for a period of ten years from the date of issue."8 2 The pro-
spectus actually stated that the issuer could not redeem the shares
"through refunding, directly or indirectly, by or in anticipation of
the incurring of any debt...., 8 3 Commonwealth Edison redeemed
the stock out of the proceeds of a common stock offering, but con-
tinued to borrow funds at the same time at rates lower than the
dividend rate on the preferred stock. The plaintiffs maintained
that the market read the quoted language as meaning that so long
as Commonwealth Edison was a net borrower, the limitation on
refunding would apply.18 4 In some respects, the market price of the
preferred stock supports this argument. Until Commonwealth
Edison announced the redemption, the preferred stock traded sub-
stantially above the redemption price.185 Efficient market theory
would suggest that this pricing data demonstrated that the consen-
sus judgment of stock traders matched the plaintiffs' assertion. If
stock traders believed that Commonwealth Edison could not re-
deem the stock while Commonwealth Edison was a net borrower,
and if the dividend rate was attractive, the price of the preferred
stock would trade in excess of the redemption price.
Commonwealth Edison, however, revealed that redemption was
a possibility at its annual meeting and in the proxy statement that
Commonwealth Edison issued when the common stock was distrib-
uted.18 6 Under the efficient market theory, the price of the pre-
ferred stock should have reflected this information. In such a situa-
tion, the price of the preferred stock never would have exceeded
the discounted present possibility that Commonwealth Edison ac-
181. 451 F. Supp. 602 (S.D. IlM. 1978), aff'd, 598 F.2d 1109 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 900 (1979).
182. 451 F. Supp. at 606.
183. Id. at 605.
184. Id. at 608.
185. Id. at 606.
186. Id.
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tually would undertake a redemption through the issuance of com-
mon stock. To resolve these inconsistencies, a court would have to
determine why the preferred stock might trade in excess of the re-
demption price despite knowledge that Commonwealth Edison
considered the possibility of a redemption, even as a net borrower.
Efficient market theory thus does not resolve the dispute between
the parties conclusively. The theory, however, does provide a
framework for narrowing and focusing the issue of whether a mate-
rial misstatement or omission occurred. 187
B. Materiality in Insider Trading Cases
The efficient market model also is useful for determining
whether insider trading has occurred. An insider trading case often
turns on whether particular information, allegedly not generally
available to the market, was material. The efficient market model
helps determine whether the information was in fact available to
the market and whether the information was of a sufficient quality
to affect the equilibrium price, and hence the total mix.'1s
187. An API analysis of the price movement of the stock could resolve this ambiguity.
See supra note 172. This analysis might reveal the source of the aberrant trading pattern.
An analogous factual pattern appears in Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Archer Daniels Midland
Co., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 99,460 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1983).
In Morgan Stanley, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
denied a motion for preliminary injunctive relief to prevent the redemption of debentures.
The court posited two reasons why the securities might trade above the redemption price:
investor anticipation of a possible tender offer; and the perception of traders concerning
what the issuer might do rather than what the issuer was legally entitled to do. Both of
these theories would be subject to empirical testing.
188. Professor Manne, citing the strong form theory of the efficient market model, be-
lieves that limitations on insider trading are unnecessary and fruitless. Manne maintains
that insider trading is a proper form of managerial compensation, that it directs the price of
stocks toward their true value, and that most attempts to control the use of inside informa-
tion are likely to fail. H. MANNE, INswR TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). Although
insider trading appears widespread, see Jaffe, Regulation Changes, supra note 24, empirical
evidence indicates that insider trading does not create strong form efficiency. See supra
notes 23-24 and accompanying text. Regulation 2 f insider trading, therefore, might create
marginal pressures to disclose important corporate information promptly, which would lead
to a market where more stock prices reflect all information. Additionally, if insider trading
was not prohibited, managers might have an incentive to overinvest in risky projects and to
profit from good news or bad news. Finally, investor confidence in the stock market's fair-
ness requires prohibition of insider trading. For a summary of the arguments concerning
insider trading, see Carlton & Fischel, supra note 23; Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trad-
ing Restrictions, 66 VA. L. Rv. 1 (1980).
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Three recent decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit provide good examples. In Securities and Ex-
change Commission v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,8 9 the SEC sued
Bausch & Lomb and its chairman of the board for providing mate-
rial inside information concerning earnings to selected securities
analysts. In the early 1970's, Bausch & Lomb marketed the first
soft contact lens in the United States. The product proved success-
ful and the company's earnings rose dramatically. Consequently,
the price of Bausch & Lomb's stock rose from $46 per share to a
peak of $194.75 in less than one year. 190 The price of Bausch &
Lomb stock, however, remained sensitive to developments affecting
soft lens sales, and securities analysts closely followed, activity in
this product market. Early in 1972, two developments adversely af-
fected Bausch & Lomb sales: Bausch & Lomb faced its first com-
petition in the market, and concern developed in the medical com-
munity over the safety of the product.19' The financial press
extensively reported these developments causing the price of
Bausch & Lomb stock to fall $40 in the three weeks before the
alleged tip. 92
Against this background, Bausch & Lomb began a series of
meetings with securities analysts in an attempt to counteract the
adverse publicity. The SEC's action arose out of meetings and tele-
phone conversations that the company's chairman of the board
held with securities analysts on March 15-16, 1972. While these
conversations were occurring, Bausch & Lomb's chief competitor
announced that it was negotiating for a new license that would al-
low introduction of a directly competitive soft lens product. 9 3
The SEC's allegations concerned the disclosure of information
about earnings, sales, and new product developments." In assess-
ing whether any of the information given to the analysts was mate-
rial, the Second Circuit applied a broad definition of the total mix.
In evaluating whether any of the information was significantly
189. 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). See also 82 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (history of SEC
negotiations with settling defendants).
190. 565 F.2d at 10.
191. Id. at 10-11.
192. Id. at 11.
193. Id. at 11-13.
194. Id. at 16-17.
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new, the court noted that other sources, such as newspaper reports
and presentations to customers, added information to the total
mix. 19 5 The Second Circuit concluded that much of the pressure on
Bausch & Lomb stock came from generally available data relating
to the threat of growing competition and to concerns about the
medical safety of the product. 96 Against the backdrop of this in-
formation, the SEC's allegations concerning disclosures of sales in-
formation and new product developments failed. 97 The board
chairman had revealed that soft lens sales had flattened out. This
fact was common knowledge in the investment community and
thus was part of the total mix. The court also held that the
delayed development of certain new products was not material be-
cause of an insignificant impact on the company and consequent
investor indifference to the information.'98 The model supports
both of these holdings. Information to which investors are indiffer-
ent cannot change the equilibrium price, nor can information
which sources have disclosed previously. The court did find that
the disclosure of the company's lowered estimate of earnings to an
analyst was material. 99 The analyst had disseminated his view
that Bausch & Lomb's earnings for the next quarter would fall to
sixty cents per share. Rumors developed in the investment commu-
nity that the company had leaked the estimate to the analyst.
Bausch & Lomb's chairman telephoned the analyst to say that the
estimate was incorrect, and revealed that the company's estimate
of sixty-five to seventy-five cents was more realistic. 20 0 Shortly af-
ter the chairman made this disclosure, the company released the
same information to several other analysts and to the Wall Street
Journal.20'
Whether the disclosures of the company's estimate of earnings
was a tip of material inside information that resulted in inside
trading presents a close question. Undoubtedly, management's
view of future earnings reduces investor uncertainty, and even if
195. Id. at 17.
196. Id. at 15-16.
197. Id. at 17-18.
198. Id. at 17.
199. Id. at 18.
200. Id. at 13.
201. Id.
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management's view is not substantially different from that of ana-
lysts, this reduced uncertainty may change the equilibrium
price.202 Bausch & Lomb presents two factual problems. First,
management initially disclosed its view of the company's future
earnings a short time before trading ended for the day. The factual
record in the case does not indicate whether the information in-
duced any trading. Second, from the opposite perspective, the
nearly simultaneous release of the information to several securities
analysts meant that, under the efficient market theory, any effect
of the disclosure on the market was rapidly assimilated. In that
sense, one could argue that the disclosure was made to the general
public.0 s
Regardless of one's view of the materiality question, the signifi-
cance of Bausch & Lomb is the court's appreciation of the impor-
tant and positive role that analysts play in the market.20 4 An im-
plicit premise of the decision is that the efforts of analysts in
producing information for the market are beneficial to the market.
This premise meshes well with the efficient market model. Al-
though the model suggests that analysts and their customers can-
not gain supranormal profits, the activities of analysts in producing
information is the mechanism that produces market efficiency.
Management contacts with analysts are a crucial part of the pro-
cess of creating an efficient market, and legal rules should not dis-
courage this process. Restrictive notions of inside information
would hinder the ability of analysts to function. 0 5 Bausch & Lomb
202. See supra notes 139-40. Management's views of future earnings contains informa-
tional content for the market.
203. Disclosure to enough analysts, and the trading thus induced, would establish the new
equilibrium price.
204. The Supreme Court's opinion in Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct. 3255 (1983), supports this
view. In Bausch & Lomb, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York refused to grant the SEC an injunction because of a lack of scienter and because a
recurrence of tipping was unlikely. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 565 F.2d 8 (2d
Cir. 1977). The Second Circuit affirmed on the second ground. Dirks raises the possibility
that the lack of pecuniary or other gain to the tipper also would prevent imposition of liabil-
ity. 103 S. Ct. at 3266. The defendants in Bausch & Lomb derived no benefit from the
leaked information. 565 F.2d at 19.
205. In Bausch & Lomb, the Second Circuit described contacts between analysts and
management as a "fencing match conducted on a tight rope." 565 F.2d at 9. Uncertain con-
ceptions of materiality create substantial risks of unwarranted allegations of tipping. Un-
doubtedly, some information is material. The problem is that a skilled analyst often can
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demonstrates that the efficient market model can assist a court's
determination of whether information received from management
is already in the total mix. Similarly, the case demonstrates the
rapidity with which the market processes information. Both of
these insights limit unbridled speculation concerning the definition
of material inside information.
Lilly v. State Teachers Retirement System 0 6 also involved alle-
gations of insider trading and presented questions of materiality.
Lilly arose from the difficulties that the real estate investment
trust (REIT) industry encountered in the mid-1970's. A REIT
makes money on the spread between the interest rates at which
the REIT borrows from banks and the rate at which the REIT
lends to real estate developers. The REIT industry suffered when
interest rates increased significantly while builders simultaneously
faced sharply rising material costs. These factors adversely affected
the real estate development business and REIT stocks. Lilly was a
difficult case because the investment community was aware of
these industry problems through numerous press reports and se-
curities analyst studies. Thus, much of the impact on the price of
any REIT stock would have occurred despite any specific informa-
tion concerning a particular trust. 0 7
The factual issue in Lilly was whether an investment analyst
had received material inside information concerning the level of
problem loans experienced by a REIT.20 In an unpublished opin-
ion, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York had held that the investment analyst had received no
material inside information because the analyst believed that the
deduce a material fact-such as earnings-from a series of apparently insignificant facts and
impressions. The legal problem involves drawing a line between material conclusions and
immaterial clues. Lorie, supra note 4. The Second Circuit, in addressing "tips" to analysts,
draws no clear line: "A skilled analyst with knowledge of the company and the industry may
piece seemingly inconsequential data together with public information into a mosaic which
reveals material non-public information." Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 165
(2d Cir. 1980). The mosaic theory thus creates considerable uncertainty. Although a court
may recognize the benefits of analysts' efforts, this recognition is not always reflected in the
court's holding. See infra note 220.
206. 608 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 939 (1980).
207. Industry market conditions play a role in the price movement of specific stocks of
companies within that industry. See King, supra note 146.
208. 608 F.2d at 56.
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
borrowers ultimately would repay all the loans and that the prob-
lem loans would not affect significantly the trust's level of divi-
dends. 20 1 The district court also noted that the information con-
cerning problem loans had been disseminated to a number of
securities analysts who monitored the financial stability of the
REIT.210
The Second Circuit, in reversing the district court's decision to
grant the defendants' motion for a directed verdict, relied on the
total mix of data available to investors. The appellate court con-
cluded that a jury question existed over whether the investment
community would view the increased level of problem loans as a
significant fact.2 11 Indeed, investors had disagreed over the rela-
tionship of dividends, loss reserves for problem loans, and the defi-
nition of problem loans.212 Some believed that a REIT should cre-
ate a reserve for problem loans and make a charge against the
funds available to pay dividends, even if the loans ultimately were
repaid. Others believed that, if a borrower would repay the loan at
some time, then a REIT need not create a current reserve, thereby
limiting the ability to pay dividends. If enough investors believed
in the first position, then the release of the additional information
could affect the equilibrium price. Thus, the conclusion of the Sec-
ond Circuit was proper.
The different positions of the district court and the appellate
court in Lilly demonstrate that application of the efficient market
theory is far from mechanical. Courts must make difficult judg-
ments about the information that an investor would find impor-
tant. This process often requires considerable inquiry into industry
conditions and the factors that enter into an investment decision.
The use of the efficient market theory provides courts with the
ability to focus the factual inquiry. Both courts in Lilly properly
attempted to assess the impact of the specific inside information
against the background of generally available information known
about the REIT industry. In some instances, however, this
factfinding process is subject to uncertainty in reconstructing the
209. Id. at 59.
210. Id. at 56 & n.1.
211. Id. at 58.
212. Id. at 59.
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relevant information set.
A third insider trading case involving a materiality question is
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc. 213 Elkind also involved the alleged
tipping of material inside information to selected securities ana-
lysts. The case raised other issues about management's duties with
respect to statements made by analysts after meetings conducted
by management. The plaintiff charged that the first of two tips had
occurred on July 10, 1972, when management confirmed that sales
of two products had slowed and that the company would issue a
preliminary earnings report soon.214 An analyst concluded that this
data would lead to a decline in the company's earnings. In the sec-
ond conversation on July 17, management specifically confirmed
that earnings would drop for the quarter.215 Both events occurred
against a backdrop of negative news about the company. Early in
1972, management had been positive about the company's pros-
pects for the year. As earnings dropped, company contacts with
analysts took on a more negative tone.218 Between June 19 and
July 5, the company's stock traded between $64.50 and $67. From
July 6 to the date that the company issued a press release concern-
ing lower earnings, the price of Liggett stock steadily dropped. By
July 14, the stock had fallen to $60. On July 17, the date of the
second tip, the stock closed at $55.25; on July 18, the day of the
press release, the closing price was $52.50.217 The district court
held that material tips of inside information occurred on both July
10 and July 17,218 but the Second Circuit ruled that only the July
17 conversation produced material inside information.219
Elkind also presents close questions in applying the efficient
213. 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980). Elkind is noted for establishing the disgorgement mea-
sure of damages in the open market tipping context. For an analysis of this aspect of
Elkind, see Recent Decisions, In an Open Market Context, Uninformed Investors May Re-
cover the Postpurchase Decline in the Market Value of Their Shares, but Recovery is Lim-
ited to the Gain Realized by the Tippee from the Inside Information-Elkind v. Liggett &
Myers, Inc., 49 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 902 (1982); and Comment, Damages for Insider Trading
Violations in an Impersonal Market Context, 7 J. CORP. 97 (1981).
214. 635 F.2d at 160-61.
215. Id. at 161.
216. Id. at 160-61.
217. Id. at 173.
218. Id. at 161.
219. Id. at 166.
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market model to the materiality question. As the Second Circuit
properly noted, the marketplace already was processing the nega-
tive information about the company's sales. Not unexpectedly, the
price of Liggett stock fell in response to the negative informa-
tion-even before the alleged tips. To separate the impact of any
additional information contained in the conversations with market
professionals from the publicly available information on the same
subjects requires sharp analysis. The July 10 conversation could
not have affected the total mix because the data disclosed was
common knowledge in the investment community. The company
had disclosed the information partially in publicly issued docu-
ments and in other contacts with securities analysts.220 Thus, the
Second Circuit correctly concluded that no material tip occurred.
Analysis of the July 17 conversation, as the court recognized, was
more difficult. The company revealed no specific numerical earn-
ings information. Management only confirmed the possibility that
earnings would decline. This statement merely supplemented, and
was based on, the sales data. As efficient market research suggests,
however, management's views about earnings contain information
for the market, even if the management view only confirms the
opinions of market participants. 221 Thus, the July 17 conversation
did reveal material information. Indeed, the substantial downward
price movement on the next trading day, when the information
was released generally, supports this conclusion. 222
220. Contrast the Second Circuit's holding in State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor
Corp., 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981). In Fluor, much of the data that the analyst relied upon
was already in the public domain, but the meeting that the analyst attended may have filled
in the analysis. The Second Circuit, applying the mosaic approach, found that at least some
of the material disclosed at the meeting may have been material.
221. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
222. For another analysis of Elkind from the perspective of the efficient market model,
see Friedman, Efficient Market Theory and Rule 10b-5 Nondisclosure Claims: A Proposal
for Reconciliation, 47 Mo. L. REv. 745 (1982). Professor Friedman argues that insiders
should have an obligation to disclose material information even in the absence of trading.
He also proposes a two-tier damage remedy for insider trading. Those who control and in-
tentionally delay disclosure to trade on the information should be responsible to all traders
for the extent of their damages. Disgorgement would be the appropriate standard for tip-
pees who could not control disclosure. The article, however, does not analyze the predicate
for liability-whether and when inside information was disclosed.
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V. CONCLUSION
The efficient market model is a powerful tool for analyzing the
materiality question. Application of the theory to the materiality
issue informs the court that the market processes information in
the aggregate. Each market participant need not have access to all
information. Rather, the court should focus on whether enough
traders had the information so that the price signalling mechanism
revealed the information. The model also indicates to the court the
alacrity with which the market processes new information.
An analysis of the case law demonstrates that, although some
courts have an intuitive sense of the model's operation, many
courts ignore the model when deciding the materiality issue. This
behavior leads to ad hoc decisionmaking and often a finding of ma-
teriality when the market already has received and processed the
information in question. The clearest examples of this phenome-
non occur in the controlled transaction context. Courts appear par-
ticularly concerned about the fairness of the terms proposed by a
controlling shareholder. Essentially, the federal securities laws do
not deal directly with the fairness of a particular transaction. The
courts, however, review fairness under the rubric of materiality.
The efficient market model suggests that the courts' concerns are
misplaced. Assuming that stock is actively traded, the market price
of the shares represents a reasoned judgment of its value. Unless
the controlling shareholder truly has material nonpublic informa-
tion, the market price of two companies is the best measure of
their relative worth. Thus, courts should use the model to make
materiality determinations in controlled transaction cases as well
as in arms length situations.
The legal test of materiality is consistent with this Article's sug-
gested approach. Both TSC Industries and the efficient market
model recognize that investors react to a total mix of information.
The model quantifies the total mix concept. The price signalling
mechanism represents the transmittal of a complete information
set of publicly available data. The courts should limit their inquiry
to whether a particular item of information has, or would have,
affected the price of a stock.
